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A RED CARD FOR FIFA: CORRUPTION AND
SCANDAL IN THE WORLD’S FOREMOST
SPORTS ASSOCIATION
Chance Esposito
I. INTRODUCTION
On a global scale, soccer (or as it is commonly called in most
other countries “football”) is the most popular sport based on its num-
bers alone with over 250 million players.1 In recent years, the sport
has become increasingly popular in nations or territories such as the
United States.2 As a result of this increased interest, the sport and its
governing organization, The Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football As-
sociation (“FIFA”) has been thrown into the global media arena in the
past two decades. The organization itself is one that promotes the
sport worldwide through tournaments and sponsorship from major
companies.3 Recently unearthed information, however, has put the ac-
tions of this organization at the center of controversy for alleged
charges including conspiracy and bribery of officials with regard to
tournament locations and media rights agreements.4 With billions of
dollars in revenue and a major global presence in the world of sports5,
the scandal surrounding FIFA and its officials will likely have signifi-
cant ramifications on the operations of the organization and how it will
continue after the investigations have concluded. This controversy is
ongoing and new information is constantly being brought to light.
The first part of this article will address the background and
organization of FIFA as a governing body for the world of soccer. The
structure of this organization will prove to be important both for pur-
poses of this article and for the overall case against FIFA. The second
part of this article will center on the World Cup, its bidding process
and the global impact that this event imposes. The third part of this
article will focus on the Justice Department’s indictment and the cor-
ruption charges asserted against the FIFA officials, their scope and
potential ramifications of this case.
1 Jack Rollin, Football, Encyclopedia Britannica. (December 8, 2015). http://www.
britannica.com/sports/football-soccer
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Fifa corruption crisis: Key questions answered. BBC NEWS. (December 21,
2015). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066
5 Id.
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II. BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE FIFA ORGANIZATION
A. History of the Organization
The history and structure of the FIFA organization, while
lengthy, will serve as an important learning tool in understanding how
this scandal came to light and what it means on a global scale. A good
starting place is the mission of the organization. As listed on the or-
ganization’s official website, there are three main objectives: (1) “De-
veloping football everywhere and for all”; (2) “ Organizing inspiring
tournaments”; and (3) “Caring about society and the environment”.6
To explore these in a little more detail, the website states: “FIFA’s pri-
mary objective is “to improve the game of football constantly and pro-
mote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and
humanitarian values, particularly through youth and development
programmes”. FIFA’s second objective is to organize international foot-
ball competitions. Football is much more than just a game. This is the
third crucial pillar of FIFA’s mission: building a better future for all
through football.”7 Overall, the main goal of this governing body seems
to have remained the same since its founding:  the promotion of
football.
Representatives of various football associations from the coun-
tries of France, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Switzerland
founded FIFA in Paris in the year 1904.8 From there, the organization
began to lay the foundation for its structure by means of statutes pro-
viding for the governing laws that would reign supreme over interna-
tional football.9 The organization also composed a Congress that would
have the final say in almost all matters it was presented.10 In addition
to statutes and a congressional body, the organization created commit-
tees (executive and emergency, in addition to others that were added
later), elected a president to oversee the organization and began to
look outward to attract global attention.11 After a few years of being
primarily restricted to European countries, efforts of the organization
to globalize its reach succeeded. In 1909 South Africa joined the ranks
of the organization, only to be followed by Argentina and Chile in 1912,
and the United States in 1913.12 With the continuing addition of vari-
6 What we stand for. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/explore-
fifa.html?intcmp=fifacom_hp_module_corporate
7 Id.
8 History of FIFA – Foundation. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/
history/index.html
9 Id.
10 Id. History of FIFA – FIFA takes shape. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-
are/history/fifa-takes-shape.html
11 Id.
12 Id.
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ous countries and other associations to the FIFA roster, the organiza-
tion realized its goal of international competitions by conducting the
first World Cup in 1930.13 Although riddled with issues ranging from
participation debates and refusals to enter, the first World Cup compe-
tition was described as a defining moment for international soccer and
was held in the host country of Uruguay.14 The organization furthered
its goal to conduct global competitions following the first world cup
and its history has proven to be problematic in the first formative
years (largely as a result from outside factors such as the British eco-
nomic crisis and the development of World War II).15 However, since
the end of World War II, the organization has been increasingly suc-
cessful in achieving its goals.16
FIFA today is composed of 211 member associations (which re-
present organized soccer for various nations or territories) that are
part of the six larger confederations based on their regional location.17
The structure has largely remained the same with the exception that it
has expanded greatly with the inclusion of numerous associations from
many nations or territories over the years.
B. Structure of FIFA
As mentioned, the globe has been sectioned off into six confed-
erations based on regional location.18 The six confederations are listed
below along with their respective association count of member nations
or territories, founding dates, and a brief description:
• Confe´de´ration Africaine de Football (“CAF”); The governing
body of African football; 54 associations; founded 1957.19
• Asian Football Confederation (“AFC”); The governing body
of Asian football; 46 associations; founded 1954.20
• Union of European Football Associations (“UEFA”); The
Union of European Football Associations is the governing
body of European football; 55 associations.21
• The Confederation of North, Central America, and Carib-
bean Association Football (“CONCACAF”); the continental
governing body for association football in North America,
13 History of FIFA – the first FIFA World Cup. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/who-we-are/history/first-fifa-world-cup.html
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Associations. FIFA.  http://www.fifa.com/associations/
18 Id.
19 Background. CAF. http://www.cafonline.com/en-us/caf/background.aspx
20 About AFC. AFC. http://www.the-afc.com/about-afc
21 About UEFA. UEFA. http://www.uefa.org/about-uefa/index.html
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Central America and the Caribbean; 41 associations;
founded 1961;22
• Oceania Football Confederation (“OFC”); OFC is the um-
brella organization of the national football associations
within Oceania. 11 associations; conceptualized in 1964; ap-
proved in 1966.23
• Confederacion Sudamericana de Futbol (“CONMEBOL”);
governing body of South American football; 10
associations.24
  FIFA provides support to these confederations in return for uphold-
ing the ideals and statutes of the organization.25 Additionally, each of
these confederations hold independent tournaments at the club and
international levels in order to further develop the sport.26
In addition to being members of the separate confederations,
member associations participate in various areas of the organizational
structure of FIFA such as voting in the presidential election as mem-
bers of the Congress.27 Each member association is granted one vote,
for example, in the FIFA presidential election process.28 This means
that even those member associations who are not heavily invested in
the sport are still eligible for casting a vote for leadership (among a few
other areas of interest such as committee elections).29 However, for de-
cisions such as who should host the next World Cup, the voting power
does not extend to the member associations. Instead, the FIFA Council
reigns supreme.30 The FIFA Council is a “non-executive, supervisory
and strategic body” chaired by the FIFA president and consists of eight
other vice-presidents and fifteen additional members who are ap-
pointed by various means adopted by the confederations and the mem-
ber associations.31 Any disputes or unresolved issues from the FIFA
Council are handed over to the Emergency Committee, which is com-
22 CONCACAF. http://www.concacaf.com/concacaf
23 History. OFC. https://www.oceaniafootball.com/about-ofc/history/
24 The National Associations of CONMEBOL. CONMEBOL. http://www.con
mebol.com/en/content/national-associations-conmebol-0
25 Associations, supra note 17.
26 Id.
27 FIFA Statutes, April 2015. http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/ge
neric/02/58/14/48/2015fifastatutesen_neutral.pdf
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 FIFA Council. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/committees/committee=188
2019/index.html
31 Id.
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prised of one member from each of the six confederations and the pres-
ident of FIFA.32
The FIFA Congress serves as the supreme body of the organi-
zation.33 This body is responsible for a number of items at their annual
meeting including decisions related to the governing statutes (imple-
mentation, additions, revisions); addition, suspension, or expulsion of
a member association; location of the FIFA headquarters; and more.34
The overall goal of this legislative body is to further develop the sport
on a global level.35
The structure and history of the FIFA Congress is an essential
part to understanding the current turmoil that FIFA faces today. The
next section of this article will dive deeper into the organization’s pri-
mary revenue maker, the World Cup.
. III. THE WORLD CUP
As discussed above, since the formation of FIFA the goal has
been to bring the sport of soccer to the global stage.36  The World Cup
is the event that allows FIFA to move closer to this goal every four
years.37 The tournament style event allows for 32 qualifying teams of
the member associations to compete in stadiums constructed by host
nations across the globe.38 It is widely considered the largest single
sporting event in the world due to its mass appeal and wide distribu-
tion.39 The bidding process of the potential host nations and the mar-
keting or advertising plans are at issue in the current controversy
involving FIFA and will be discussed in further detail below.
A. Marketing, Influence, and Revenue
In order to truly grasp how influential and popular the World
Cup has become (especially in recent years) a look at the numbers
from past competitions is key. For example, the 2010 World Cup in
South Africa was shown in 204 countries across the world with sta-
dium attendance hitting a total of 3.1 million spectators.40 In addition,
32 Bureau of the Council. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/committees/commit
tee=1882020/index.html
33 FIFA Congress. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/fifa-congress/all-you-need-
to-know/index.html
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 What we stand for. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/explore-
fifa.html?intcmp=fifacom_hp_module_corporate
37 FIFA World Cup. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/worldcup/
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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the World Cup competitions also serve as the main source of revenue
for FIFA.41 The 2014 Brazil World Cup allowed the organization to
clear over 2 billion dollars in profit after deducting its costs from the
total of 4.8 billion dollars it received.42 These numbers show that the
World Cup is a profit-creating event capable of keeping FIFA opera-
tional. The organization’s revenue is generated almost entirely from
“the sale of television, marketing, hospitality and licensing rights for
the FIFA World Cup.”43 In fact, the broadcasting and sponsorship
rights of the 2014 Brazil World Cup alone accounted for $3 billon in
revenue.44 FIFA has many sponsors that support its endeavors in the
World Cup every four years and those sponsors often are considered
global powers themselves. Some of the major sponsors include Coca-
Cola, Visa, Hyundai, Adidas, Budweiser, McDonald’s, and more.45
These sponsors pay huge sums of money for various perks such as ad-
vertisements, promotion, and the use of FIFA official marks.46 In addi-
tion to these perks, the sponsors also have some measure of power
with regard to the organization. Following the charges brought against
FIFA earlier this year, almost all of the major sponsors have called for
further investigations and in some cases reform within FIFA itself.47
Pending the current investigation, FIFA will need to make changes to
its structure and performance in order to continue doing business with
global powerhouse companies.
B. Bidding process
The process by which FIFA selects future host nations for the
World Cup is called the bidding process.48 FIFA’s official website lists
the following “milestones” as part of the bidding process:
• “FIFA sends out requests for expressions of interest
• Member Associations (“MAs”) express an interest in bid-
ding for a specific event
41 Paul Sargent, How Fifa makes and spends its money, BBC News. (May 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32923882
42 Id.
43 Finances. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/governance/finances/index.html
44 See, Sargent, supra note 41.
45 Isabelle Fraser, A look at the massive sponsor contracts that FIFA could lose.
Business Insider. (May 2015). http://www.businessinsider.com/a-look-at-the-mas
sive-sponsor-contracts-that-fifa-could-lose-2015-5
46 FIFA Partners. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/marketing/sponsorship/
partners/
47 Fraser, supra note 45.
48 Bidding process. FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/governance/competition-organisa
tion/bidding-process.html
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• FIFA sends out bidding information, including the Bidding
Manual and supporting documents (Hosting Agreements
etc.)
• FIFA workshop for interested bidders
• MAs return the Bidding Agreement confirming compliance
with bid requirements
• MAs submit bids in accordance with the Bidding Manual
• FIFA evaluates the bid submissions and identifies the se-
lected candidate for approval.
• FIFA recommendation
• FIFA announces the successful host for the event”49
Bidding proposal requirements are substantial and the host
nation must either meet or demonstrate that it will meet the require-
ments in order to be considered.50 A reading of the proposal submitted
by Japan for the 2022 World Cup shows the extensive nature of the
bidding process. Among the written proposal are requirements for a
set number of stadiums, each of which must meet stringent inspection
standards, must be able to hold a specified number of spectators,
which should ideally be located throughout the country.51 In addition
to specific stadium requirements, the applicant should be able to ac-
count for training sites for member competitors, hotels for both guests
and for competitors, significant infrastructure and transportation
guidelines, environmental guidelines, as well as support for how the
host nation would further develop football around the world.52 Follow-
ing completion of the bidding processes, final reports are proposed con-
taining risk analysis figures on the potential host nation and are
supplied to the Executive Committee for consideration.53
The Executive Committee is responsible for the selection of the
host nation by a vote of its twenty-four members (outlined above).54
Executive Committee members visit each prospective host country to
inspect the stadiums, infrastructure and the potential land in develop-
ment.55 Voting then takes place behind closed doors by means of secret
49 Id.
50 Ewan Macdonald. Goal.com’s Ewan Macdonald looks at how the fate of the
world’s biggest tournament will be decided. . . . Goal. http://www.goal.com/en/news/
3512/20182022-world-cup-host/2010/11/29/2234600/world-cup-bidding-process-ex
plained-how-the-2018-2022-world
51 2022 World Cup: Bid Evaluation Report: Japan. http://www.fifa.com/mm/docu
ment/tournament/competition/01/33/74/42/b1jpne.pdf
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Macdonald, supra note 50.
55 Id.
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ballot.56 If the vote results in a tie, the President of FIFA will cast the
deciding vote.57 A winner is announced (usually for the next two World
Cups) and the process concludes.
The bidding process in recent years has been the subject of
much controversy amid allegations of bribery in the form of “cash for
votes” and due to the secrecy of the FIFA site selection process (for
example, some documents are made available to the public while
others are kept private).58 To some, the most recent decision by FIFA
to award the 2018 World Cup to Russia and the 2022 World Cup to
Qatar are viewed as the product of rampant bribery (more so in the
case of Qatar).59 While the small oil-rich company has not been named
in any pending legal suits (either in the United States or in Switzer-
land), many cast doubts as to the innocence claimed by that country’s
officials in the World Cup bidding process.60 A discussion of the legal
charges brought against FIFA by the United States is the next focus of
this paper. It is important to keep in mind the bidding process laid out
above, as the indictments from the United States Department of Jus-
tice focus on this issue specifically.
IV. THE UNITED STATES INDICTMENT OF FIFA OFFICIALS
The United Stated Department of Justice has been actively in-
vestigating various charges against high-ranking FIFA officials for the
past several years.61 Although no specific reason for this investigation
has been disclosed, some believe that the results of the bidding process
for the 2018 and 2022 World Cup raised red flags for those involved.62
At the present time, the United States Department of Justice has ob-
tained: (i) an initial indictment in May of 2015 (“The First Indict-
ment”); and (ii) a subsequent, more inclusive indictment in December
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Rory Jones. FIFA Scandal Prompts New Scrutiny of Qatar World Cup Bid.
WALL STREET JOURNAL. (May 2015). http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifa-scandal-
prompts-new-scrutiny-of-qatar-world-cup-bid-1432920652
60 Id.
61 Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives indicted for Racketeering
Conspiracy and Corruption., Department of Justice. (May 27, 2015), http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racke
teering-conspiracy-and; see Paul Blake, FIFA scandal: Why the US is policing a
global game, BBC News. (May 28, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-cana
da-32889845.
62 Paul Blake, supra note 61.
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of 2015 (“The Superseding Indictment”).63 This section of the article
will discuss both in detail.
63 Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and
Corruption., Department of Justice. (December 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-
corruption.
54 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 16:1
64 http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/450251/download
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A. The First Indictment
As mentioned, The First Indictment issued by the United
States Department of Justice occurred in May of 2015 and was un-
sealed by a federal court in Brooklyn, New York.65 The forty-seven-
count indictment names fourteen separate defendants, nine of which
are FIFA Officials.66 The indictment includes charges of racketeering,
wire fraud, and money-laundering conspiracies - among various other
charges - and spans a “24 year scheme [by the defendants] to enrich
themselves through the corruption of international soccer.”67 More
specifically the indictment charges the defendants with abusing their
“positions of trust to acquire millions of dollars in bribes and kick-
backs.”68 The nine FIFA officials named in the indictment include: Jef-
frey Webb (FIFA executive committee member, CONCACAF
president, etc.), Eduardo Li (FIFA executive committee member, CON-
CACAF executive committee member), Julio Rocha (FIFA develop-
ment officer, held roles on smaller associations as well), Costas Takkas
(Attache´ to the CONCACAF president), Jack Warner (Former FIFA
vice president and executive committee member, CONCACAF presi-
dent), Eugenio Figueredo (FIFA vice president and executive commit-
tee member), Rafael Esquivel (CONMEBOL executive committee
member), Jose Maria Marin (member of the FIFA organizing commit-
tee for the Olympic football tournaments), and Nicolas Leoz (Former
FIFA executive committee member and CONMEBOL president).69
The other individual defendants are executives of sports marketing
companies primarily located in North, Central and South American
countries that are alleged to have committed the crimes in conjunction
with those FIFA representatives named above.70 It is clear that those
involved in this scandal are key players in the FIFA organization.
The actual indictment recites numerous instances spanning
from the early 1990s until more recently (the 2010s) in which the
named FIFA officials entered into agreements with the leaders of the
sports marketing agencies providing them with substantial systematic
kickbacks and bribes in the amount of $150 million dollars in return
for lucrative contracts.71 As noted, the media and marketing rights for
FIFA events are highly profitable. The difficulty with awarding con-
tracts solely to those few companies that provide kickbacks and bribes
is that the market is then essentially closed off, such that only a few
65 Nine FIFA, supra note 61.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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marketing companies obtain all of the rights to the preclusion of
others.72 In addition to this, the indictment alleges that the actions of
these FIFA officials and the sports marketing executives have “de-
prived FIFA, the confederations and their constituent organizations –
and therefore, the national member associations, national teams,
youth leagues and development programs that rely on financial sup-
port from their parent organizations – of the full value of those
rights.”73
The United Stated Department of Justice cites proper jurisdic-
tion over this case due to the fact that so many of the alleged offenses
occurred entirely or at least partly within the United States - often
within the State of New York.74 Specifically, the indictment describes
how the defendants “. . . relied heavily on the United States financial
system in connection with their activities. . . .”75 It is argued that a
number of the wire transfers occurred within United States banks,
branches of multiple United States institutions were used in dealings
of these alleged misappropriated funds and more.76
At the time of the first indictment, Swiss authorities in Zurich
arrested seven of the defendants charged in the indictment.77 They
currently face extradition to the United States provided that their
cases comply with the extradition requirements/laws that have been
established under Swiss law.78 The first indictment was extensive and
shocked much of the world when it was released. The superseding in-
dictment created even greater shockwaves.
B. The Superseding Indictment
On December 3, 2015, an additional sixteen FIFA officials were
indicted for racketeering, wire fraud, and money laundering conspira-
cies, “in connection with their participation in a 24-year scheme to en-
rich themselves through the corruption of international soccer.”79 The
Superseding Indictment not only increased the number of defendants
from nine to twenty-seven, it increased the number of charges from
72 Id.
73 May 22, 2015 Indictment at 30., United States v. Webb (No. 15CR0252) http://
www.justice.gov/opa/file/450211/download.
74 Id. at 40-41.
75 Id at 39.
76 Id at 40.
77 Nine FIFA, supra note 61.
78 Clive Coleman, FIFA, extradition and Blatter; How will it play out?, BBC News.
(June 2015). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-32973203
79 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted
for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption (December 3, 2015) [hereinafter Dep’t
of Justice Press Release], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-offi
cials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-corruption.
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forty-seven to ninety-two.80 The sixteen new defendants were all in-
volved with the FIFA organization, either serving as high-ranking offi-
cials or general officials who operated “under the FIFA umbrella.”81
Among them were officials working primarily within CONCACAF and
CONMEBOL.82
The time frame of the events listed in The Superseding Indict-
ment aligned with that of The First Indictment (1991 until 2010), as
do most of the charges alleged.83 However, the range of charges was
broadened after additional crimes were added. One of the additional
crimes that seemed to be the most influential and problematic for the
FIFA organization involved the voting process to nominate the host of
the 2010 FIFA World Cup.
In 2004, FIFA’s executive committee selected South Africa over
Morocco and Egypt to host the 2010 World Cup.84 Official allegations
surfaced regarding internally-related FIFA bribes that were tied to
Morocco and South Africa’s candidacy to host the World Cup.85 The
parties mentioned in The Superseding Indictment included Jack
Warner, who was named in The First Indictment as a defendant, Dar-
ren Warner, various unnamed co-conspirators, and Charles Blazer.
The indictment alleges that Warner and Blazer traveled to Morocco in
the months before the FIFA executive committee voted for the nomi-
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.  The new sixteen defendants are all ranking officials within the FIFA organ-
ization: Alfredo Hawit (FIFA vice president and executive committee member and
CONCACAF president, former CONCACAF vice president); Ariel Alvarado (FIFA
disciplinary committee and former CONCACAF executive committee member);
Rafael Callejas (FIFA television and marketing committee member); Brayan
Jimenez (current Guatemalan soccer federation president and member of FIFA
committee for fair play and social responsibility); Rafael Salguero (Former FIFA
executive committee member and Guatemalan soccer federation president); Hec-
tor Trujillo (current Guatemalan soccer federation general secretary); Reynaldo
Vasquez (former Salvadoran soccer federation president); Juan Angel Napout
(FIFA vice president and executive committee member and CONMEBOL presi-
dent); Manuel Burga (FIFA development committee member); Carlos Chavez
(CONMEBOL treasurer); Luis Chiriboga (Ecuadorian soccer federation president
and member of the CONMEBOL executive committee); Marco Polo de Nero (presi-
dent of the Brazilian soccer federation, former FIFA executive committee mem-
ber); Eduardo Deluca (former CONMEBOL general secretary), Jose Luis Meiszner
(CONMEBOL general secretary); Romer Osuna (member of the FIFA audit and
compliance committee and former CONMEBOL treasurer); and Ricardo Teixiera
(former Brazilian soccer federation president and FIFA executive committee mem-
ber). Id.
83 Indictment, U.S. v. Hawit, Cr. No. 15-252 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015).
84 Id. at 92.
85 Id. at 91- 2.
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nee to host the 2010 World Cup,86 at which time a “representative of
the Moroccan bid committee offered to pay $1 million to Warner in
exchange for his agreement to cast his secret ballot on the FIFA execu-
tive committee for Morocco.”87 This allegation, while shocking, was not
the worst. After the alleged Moroccan bribe, Blazer learned from
Warner that the South African government was prepared to pay $10
million to CFU – one of the smaller regional associations governed by
Warner – to “support the African diaspora.”88 Blazer allegedly had
knowledge that this offer was in exchange for the agreement of
Warner, Blazer, and a co-conspirator, who was also a member of the
executive committee at FIFA, to vote affirmatively for South Africa to
become the 2010 World Cup host country.89 Warner ultimately ac-
cepted the deal and promised to pay Blazer $1 million of the total $10
million South African payment.90 In May of 2004, South Africa was
declared to be the next host of the 2010 World Cup tournament.91
The indictment of the sixteen additional FIFA defendants fur-
ther alleged a series of setbacks for payment of the $10 million. Even-
tually, however, another co-conspirator arranged for the separate
installment payments that added up to roughly $10 million. These in-
stallment payments were wired to a single Bank of America account in
New York that belonged to Warner.92 Warner then laundered the
funds from his Bank of America account to other accounts, thus al-
lowing him to apportion money for his personal use.93 Subsequently,
Blazer stated that Warner was then able to make payments to Blazer
that totaled $750,000.94
The detailed description of the 2010 World Cup bribery investi-
gation is important for understanding the potential severity of the
charges alleged and the implications of those actions. If the indictment
is correct in its allegations, a series of very serious offenses have been
committed by members of the FIFA organization raising questions of
bribery and falsehoods in past and present World Cup tournaments.
This will likely not be the last indictment that concerns this organiza-
tion and its corruption.
The parties that have yet to be extradited to the United States
still face a long road ahead. If found guilty, it is likely that their pun-
ishments will include a forfeiture of their bribes, as well as jail
86 Id. at 91.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 92.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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sentences for some, if not all, defendants.95 The United States Depart-
ment of Justice press release announcing these indictments stated
that “the indicted and convicted defendants face maximum terms of
incarceration of 20 years for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, wire fraud,
money laundering conspiracy, and obstruction of justice charges.”96 In
addition to the possibility of forfeiture of their bribes, the defendants
also face mandatory restitution and fines.97
V. WHAT THIS SCANDAL MEANS FOR FIFA MOVING FORWARD
The scandal surrounding the world’s foremost sports associa-
tion will likely leave a negative mark on the organization for years to
come. Reputation damage aside, however, current sponsors of the
FIFA organization have already begun to voice their concerns of the
corruption allegations.98 Coca-Cola, for example, called for an indepen-
dent third party restructuring of the organization, declaring, “We be-
lieve that establishing this independent commission will be the most
credible way for FIFA to approach its reform process and is necessary
to build back the trust it has lost.”99 McDonald’s Corporation, another
major sponsor of the FIFA World Cup, expressed similar concerns,
stating, “. . . recent allegations and indictments have severely tar-
nished FIFA in a way that strikes at the very heart of our sponsorship
. . . FIFA must not implement meaningful change to restore trust and
credibility with fans and sponsors alike. The world expects concrete
actions and so does McDonald’s.”100
Aside from sponsorship pressure, FIFA has come under intense
scrutiny for its recent award of the 2018 (Russia) and 2022 (Qatar)
World Cups. Following the indictments and corruption allegations re-
garding South Africa, many speculate that similar conduct occurred
when FIFA selected Russia and Qatar as the host countries for 2018
and 2022.101 If that is the case, many analysts have already begun
looking into whether Russia and Qatar could be stripped of their host-
ing duties.102 Any further discoveries of corruption and scandal will
95 Dep’t of Justice Press Release, supra note 79.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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BBC (July 2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/33575358.
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make it that much harder for the organization and its accompanying
member associations to return to the status they once held. The seed of
doubt has already been planted in the minds of many FIFA fans and it
will be up to the organization itself to regain the trust of the world.
VI. CONCLUSION
As stated at the beginning of this article, the South Africa
World Cup scandal and the corresponding lawsuits are ongoing. With
every new piece of information we must consider the potential implica-
tions that follow. As FIFA is the largest supporter and promoter of the
sport of football, it will not be a stable journey from this point forward.
The United States Department of Justice continues its investigation
into more recent decisions, votes, and other functions of the organiza-
tion. Substantial and systematic reform will be necessary in order for
FIFA to regain the world’s trust as a leading player in sports.
